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A Federal and State Transport Plan for Movement of Eggs and Egg
Products from Commercial Egg Production Premises in a High-
Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Control Area
Abstract
The FAST Eggs Plan is a voluntary plan for commercial egg producers intended to facilitate business
continuity following an outbreak of HPAI. Participation in the FAST Eggs Plan will reduce the time required
for regulatory officials to determine that it is safe for eggs and egg products from noninfected chickens located
within a control area to move into market channels located outside the control area. The FAST Eggs Plan has 5
components. First, a Biosecurity Checklist for Egg Production Premises and Auditors includes biosecurity
measures that will help prevent introduction of avian influenza virus onto egg-production premises. Second,
registration with the National Animal Identification System is required for participating egg-production
premises, and the premises location is verified by GPS coordinates. Third, epidemiological data are used to
determine whether an egg farm has been exposed directly or indirectly to birds and other animals, products,
materials, people, or aerosols from premises on which HPAI virus has been confirmed. Fourth, the absence of
HPAI virus on FAST Eggs Plan premises is verified by negative RRT-PCR assay results from a minimum of 5
dead chickens selected from those that die each day from each house on the farm. Fifth, the risk of exposure to
HPAI virus is estimated by use of an equation based on risks not mitigated by quarantine and distance from
infected premises.
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The FAST Eggs Plan is a voluntary plan for com-mercial egg producers intended to facilitate busi-
ness continuity following an outbreak of HPAI. Par-
ticipation in the FAST Eggs Plan will reduce the time 
required for regulatory officials to determine that it 
is safe for eggs and egg products from noninfected 
chickens located within a control area to move into 
market channels located outside the control area. 
The FAST Eggs Plan has 5 components. First, a Bi-
osecurity Checklist for Egg Production Premises and 
Auditors includes biosecurity measures that will help 
prevent introduction of avian influenza virus onto 
egg-production premises. Second, registration with 
the National Animal Identification System is required 
for participating egg-production premises, and the 
premises location is verified by GPS coordinates. 
Third, epidemiological data are used to determine 
whether an egg farm has been exposed directly or 
indirectly to birds and other animals, products, ma-
terials, people, or aerosols from premises on which 
HPAI virus has been confirmed. Fourth, the absence 
of HPAI virus on FAST Eggs Plan premises is veri-
fied by negative RRT-PCR assay results from a mini-
mum of 5 dead chickens selected from those that die 
each day from each house on the farm. Fifth, the risk 
of exposure to HPAI virus is estimated by use of an 
equation based on risks not mitigated by quarantine 
and distance from infected premises.
In Hong Kong in 1997, an H5N1 HPAI virus was 
transmitted directly to humans from chickens, result-
ing in 18 human infections and 6 human deaths.1 All 
genes in that virus were of avian origin, and avian in-
fluenza was recognized as a potentially zoonotic dis-
ease.2 Descendants of this particular H5N1 virus con-
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tinued to circulate in Asia, and a major outbreak in 
chickens occurred in South Korea in December 2003. 
In January and February 2004, the disease was report-
ed in Vietnam, Japan, and 5 other Asian countries.3
High-pathogenicity avian influenza was confined 
to Asia until a tipping point in the geographic spread of 
H5N1 HPAI occurred in April 2005. At that time, a high 
mortality rate was reported in migratory waterfowl on 
Qinghai Lake in northern China,4 and migration pat-
terns of geese, gulls, and cormorants on that lake ex-
tend to and include other locations in Asia, the Middle 
East, Africa, and Europe.5 During the summer and fall 
of 2005, the H5N1 virus spread westward from China 
across Mongolia and Siberia to the Ural Mountains of 
Russia, to Kazakhstan, and eventually to Romania and 
Turkey. By the end of 2006, the H5N1 virus had spread 
to India and Bangladesh, Israel, Nigeria, Egypt, Niger, 
Cameroon, and additional countries in Europe.3 Since 
December 2003, more than 250 million poultry have 
been killed through slaughter eradication programs or 
by the H5N1 virus. In addition to birds and humans, 
the H5N1 virus has infected domestic cats, tigers, leop-
ards, dogs, and swine.6
The H5N1 virus represents a continuing threat to 
the poultry industry, public health, and food security 
in the United States. This virus could enter the United 
States via smuggled live birds (psittacines and fighting 
game birds) or smuggled poultry products.7,8 It could 
also enter via migratory waterfowl (birds of the orders 
Anseriformes or Charadriiformes) from Asia, which 
share summer breeding grounds in Alaska with migra-
tory waterfowl from the North American continent.9 In 
April 2006, an early detection system for H5N1 HPAI in 
wild migratory birds was initiated by the USDA, the US 
Department of the Interior, and the US Fish and Wild-
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life Service. Employees with the US Geological Survey 
in Alaska continue to monitor migrating birds for the 
presence of H5N1 virus, and as of October 2009, none 
has been detected.10 As a primary safeguard, the USDA 
maintains trade restrictions on the importation of live 
poultry or poultry products from countries in which 
the H5N1 HPAI virus has been identified in commercial 
or traditionally raised poultry.11 In addition, the USDA’s 
Smuggling Intervention and Trade Compliance unit has 
increased its monitoring of domestic commercial mar-
kets for illegally smuggled poultry and poultry prod-
ucts. All imported live birds from countries other than 
Canada must be quarantined for 30 days at a USDA 
quarantine facility and tested for avian influenza virus 
of any strain before entering the country.
Sources of Avian Influenza Virus
The most important sources of avian influenza vi-
rus include contaminated poultry manure, respiratory 
secretions, live poultry, dead poultry, unwashed eggs, 
and reused packing materials.12 High-pathogenicity 
avian influenza viruses are shed in feces and in nasal 
and respiratory tract secretions and are transmitted via 
ingestion of contaminated feces or inhalation of aero-
solized dust or respiratory droplets.13 Contamination 
of feed, water, or litter leads to rapid spread within a 
poultry house. Eggs laid 3 to 4 days after infection of 
chickens by an HPAI virus can contain virus,13 but ver-
tical transmission of HPAI virus to chicks via this route 
has not been reported.
Spread of avian influenza viruses from an infected 
index flock of domesticated poultry to other susceptible 
poultry is usually a result of human activity.12,13 Move-
ment of infected birds or contaminated manure to other 
locations is a common mechanism of disease transmis-
sion.14 In addition, movement of people, equipment, and 
vehicles contaminated by virus-laden feces or respirato-
ry secretions can mechanically carry the 
virus to other premises. People moving 
between poultry premises include truck 
drivers hauling feed to farms, spent hens 
to processing plants, or dead birds to ren-
dering plants; utility (electricity and wa-
ter) company workers; vaccination, beak 
trimming, and hen-catching crews; and 
individuals providing management and 
health services.12 Shared equipment that 
may move from one farm to another in-
cludes items used for manure handling, 
bird catching and transport (portable 
coops and crates), vaccination, beak trim-
ming, and egg transport.12 In addition, ve-
hicles such as tractors, automobiles, and 
trucks can carry people and equipment 
between chicken-rearing sites, egg-pro-
duction sites, and various nonfarm sites.
National HPAI Response Plan  
and Control Areas
In response to the threat posed by 
H5N1 HPAI virus, a National Highly 
Pathogenic Avian Influenza Response 
Plan was developed by the USDA APHIS in cooperation 
with the nation’s poultry industry and other stakehold-
ers. A summary of the plan was initially published in 
April 2006, with amended versions appearing in Au-
gust 2006 and August 2007.15 This contingency plan 
provides USDA APHIS operational guidelines for the 
unified state and federal animal health official emer-
gency response should HPAI be detected in domestic 
poultry in the United States. Roles and responsibilities, 
quarantine and movement controls, and procedures 
for appraisal and compensation, euthanasia, disposal, 
cleaning and disinfection, biosecurity, and wildlife 
management are described and defined. In addition, 
the response plan provides for the stockpiling and use 
of personal protective equipment for those involved in 
the emergency response.
In the event of an outbreak of HPAI, state and 
federal regulatory officials would immediately estab-
lish, at a minimum, an infected zone within a 2.0-mile 
(3-km) radius around infected premises and a buffer 
zone, which would immediately surround the infected 
zone and extend outward to a 6.2-mile (10-km) radius 
around the infected premises (Figure 1). The control 
area would consist of the infected zone and the buffer 
zone; movement of susceptible species, potentially con-
taminated transport vehicles, and potentially contami-
nated animal products into and out of the control area 
would be restricted by state and federal animal health 
officials to prevent further spread of the virus. Within 
96 hours after identifying the index case, the nature of 
the outbreak would be characterized, epidemiological 
links to other premises would be identified, and mitiga-
tion strategies would be developed.
The national response plan continues to evolve on 
the basis of ongoing feedback from state animal health 
officials, the poultry industry, and the availability of new 
scientific information about avian influenza. The goal 
of the national response plan is to contain and eradicate 
Figure	1—Diagram	of	HPAI	response	zones	in	the	US	National	HPAI	Response	Plan.
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HPAI virus in domestic poultry by integrating the capa-
bilities and resources of the federal government, states, 
tribal nations, local communities, and private organi-
zations. An additional goal, and potential competing 
interest, is the continuity of business for egg produc-
tion in which quarantine orders are based on actual 
biosecurity conditions, epidemiological threats, and 
actual diagnostic results and not on political bound-
aries or geospatial considerations alone.
Business Continuity in Control Areas
Business continuity will be a challenge for owners 
of noninfected commercial table-egg premises in a con-
trol area. Movement of eggs and egg products in such 
areas may be restricted for at least 96 hours, which could 
be economically disastrous for large, modern egg-pro-
duction operations. A typical modern in-line egg-pro-
duction facility in the United States contains 1.5 to 4.0 
million laying hens of varying ages. Assuming a 75% 
mean laying rate and eggs priced at $1.00/dozen, 1.13 
to 3.0 million eggs are produced each day with a market 
value of $94,166 to $250,000. Maximum egg-storage 
capacity at most egg-production premises is limited to 
the number of eggs produced during a 48-hour period. 
If transport of eggs and egg products is delayed for > 48 
hours, all eggs produced thereafter must be destroyed. 
Of even more importance is the fact that today’s egg 
industry operates on a “just-in-time” basis. Each day, 
eggs move from production sites to food service dis-
tributors, retail stores, and distribution centers owned 
by fast-food restaurants and grocery store chains. If an 
egg operation in a control area cannot move eggs or 
egg products into market channels, many of its custom-
ers will exhaust their supply of eggs in 24 to 48 hours 
and be forced to look for an alternative supplier. Con-
sequently, the greatest economic impact on individual 
egg producers in a control area may be the loss of cus-
tomers, which is a loss that could be permanent and 
economically fatal to the business.
FAST Eggs Plan
Creation of a plan to facilitate business continuity 
by allowing movement of eggs and egg products from 
noninfected premises within an avian influenza control 
area was the objective of a cooperative agreement be-
tween APHIS and faculty at Iowa State University. The 
result of this work is the Federal and State Transport 
Plan for Movement of Eggs and Egg Products from 
Commercial Table Egg Premises in a High-Pathoge-
nicity Avian Influenza Control Area. Components of 
the plan include the following: minimum biosecurity 
standards for participating egg premises, location veri-
fication with GPS coordinates for egg premises and in-
fected premises in a control area, epidemiological data 
including a questionnaire to investigate contact with 
infected premises and flock production variables, an 
active surveillance program for avian influenza that 
makes use of RRT-PCR assay testing, and an analysis 
algorithm that provides a GRE that can be used by inci-
dent commanders as a rapid decision-making tool. The 
FAST Eggs Plan is being developed to promote an ap-
propriate emergency response to HPAI, and if accepted 
and adopted by state and federal animal health officials 
and industry stakeholders, it will be incorporated into 
the national response plan.
Minimum biosecurity standards—Biosecurity is 
the first and most important means of preventing in-
troduction of avian influenza viruses onto premises.12,16 
The FAST Eggs Plan Biosecurity Checklist for Egg 
Production Premises and Auditors consists of a list of 
biosecurity measures that, if fully implemented, will 
help reduce the risk of introducing HPAI virus onto 
egg-production premises. Biosecurity measures on this 
checklist were selected on the basis of extensive input 
from egg producers, state and federal epidemiologists, 
and veterinarians employed by the egg industry, uni-
versities, and federal regulatory agencies. Voluntarily 
participating egg-production companies will provide 
yes or no responses to biosecurity statements on the 
checklist. Yes means that the biosecurity measure is a 
company policy, the policy is enforced, and the mea-
sure is included in the company’s written biosecurity 
plan. No means that the biosecurity measure is not a 
company policy and the premises do not qualify for the 
FAST Eggs Plan until the deficiency is corrected. To 
participate in the FAST Eggs Plan, staff on egg-produc-
tion premises must use all core biosecurity measures on 
the checklist.
An auditor will be assigned to participating egg 
premises by the State Animal Health Official after con-
sultation with the Federal Area Veterinarian in Charge. 
An official auditor must be a state or federal animal 
health official (or another individual) deemed to be 
qualified and approved by the State Animal Health Of-
ficial and the Veterinarian in Charge. Auditors will be 
required to attend USDA-approved training sessions to 
promote uniformity and objectivity of the audits. Audi-
tors are tasked with confirming the validity of biosecu-
rity statements checked “yes” and submitting a writ-
ten report of their findings to the State Animal Health 
Official, the Veterinarian in Charge, and the manager 
of the egg premises. To protect the biosecurity of the 
egg operations, auditors will survey the outside areas 
on the premises and egg-processing areas but will not 
enter the chicken houses. Data on daily mortality rate, 
feed consumption, and egg production for each house 
on egg-production premises will be available to audi-
tors on a computer in the farm manager’s office. Audi-
tors can access these data without entering the chicken 
houses. An approved audit, no more than 6 months 
old, must be on file with the State Animal Health Of-
ficial and the Veterinarian in Charge for egg premises 
to participate in the FAST Eggs Plan. The State Animal 
Health Official and the Veterinarian in Charge must 
decide whether the biosecurity level of egg-production 
premises is sufficient to allow participation (pass) or 
is not (fail). For premises that fail a biosecurity audit, 
the reasons for failure will be provided in writing to the 
farm manager. Farm managers then have the option of 
taking corrective action and requesting another audit.
Audits are premises specific, and premises may vary 
in size from a single stand-alone chicken house to mul-
tiple chicken houses at a modern in-line egg-produc-
tion complex. If a company produces eggs at multiple 
locations, all participating premises must have a sepa-
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rate audit. At least 1 animal health official from each 
state with participating egg producers will be expected 
to attend annual USDA-approved training sessions for 
Egg Premises Auditors to review the clinical signs and 
lesions associated with avian influenza; discuss inter-
pretation of data pertaining to mortality rate, feed con-
sumption, and egg production; and promote uniformity 
of audits for the nation’s egg industry.
Location verification of FAST Eggs Plan prem-
ises with GPS coordinates—Egg-production premises 
participating in the FAST Eggs Plan will be required 
to register with the NAIS.17 The NAIS is a voluntary 
state-federal-industry partnership that consists of 3 
parts: premises identification, animal identification, 
and tracking of animal movement. Registering premises 
does not require participation in animal identification 
and tracking. Longitudinal and latitudinal coordinates 
for geographic locations of each participating egg oper-
ation will be determined by a state or federal employee 
familiar with the NAIS and trained to use a GPS receiv-
er. Data from the GPS and coordinates of participating 
commercial premises and nearby backyard flocks will be 
collected in a format compatible with that used by the 
USDA Center for Epidemiology and Animal Health in 
Fort Collins, Colo.18 A premises identification number 
will be assigned by the state in which the egg premises 
are located. Participants may opt to register their prem-
ises online or by mailing or faxing forms to their state 
contact, whose information is provided on the NAIS 
Web site.17 Premises registration forms are available on 
the Web site of each state’s Department of Agriculture.
Global positioning system coordinates of poultry 
premises within a 2-mile (3.2-km) radius of the FAST 
Eggs Plan premises will also be determined by trained 
state or federal personnel. State or federal personnel may 
visit premises and ask residents to voluntarily provide in-
formation concerning the presence of domestic birds on 
their properties. Locations of the FAST Eggs Plan premis-
es and surrounding domestic bird premises will be avail-
able to the incident commander at a secure Web site.
Epidemiological data—In the event of an outbreak 
of HPAI, completion of a questionnaire by managers of 
participating egg operations will provide epidemiologi-
cal information that will allow foreign animal disease 
investigators to determine whether the FAST Eggs Plan 
premises have been exposed directly or indirectly to 
birds and other animals, products, materials, people, 
or aerosols from the infected premises. Once infected 
premises have been identified, a premises quarantine 
will be imposed and domesticated birds will be sub-
ject to depopulation and proper disposal. If exposure is 
deemed to have occurred, the FAST Eggs Plan premises 
will be classified as contact premises, which are premis-
es with birds or products that, based on epidemiological 
information and findings of the foreign animal disease 
investigator, have been potentially exposed to HPAI vi-
rus from infected premises.15 The contact premises will 
be quarantined and subjected to disease control mea-
sures that include diagnostic testing and quarantine. If 
the contact premises are deemed infected, then mass 
depopulation and disposal of birds or other susceptible 
animals will be carried out.
In addition to completing a questionnaire at the 
start of an incident, staff at participating facilities will 
be required to submit daily information on feed con-
sumption and egg production for each chicken house 
on premises and the number of chickens that die in 
each house. These data will be submitted directly to the 
Web-based server on a daily basis and will be available 
to the incident commander during the period when the 
FAST Eggs Plan premises are in a control area.
Active surveillance program—Absence of H5 or 
H7 avian influenza virus infection on FAST Eggs Plan 
premises will be verified by requiring that chickens 
from each house on a given farm be tested each day by 
means of the RRT-PCR assay, with negative results.19,20 
In addition, chickens in these flocks must be free of 
clinical signs of disease and the flocks must have no 
unexplained increase in mortality rate or decline in egg 
production or feed consumption.
A minimum of 5 dead chickens from those that 
died each day or from euthanatized sick birds from 
each house (flock) will be placed in an approved con-
tainer (eg, heavy-duty plastic garbage bag) each morn-
ing. Each container will be labeled with the farm of 
origin, house of origin, number of birds found dead in 
the house that day, and the NAIS premises identifica-
tion number. Containers will be taken to a designated 
pick-up point, typically the public road closest to the 
premises. After oropharyngeal samples have been ob-
tained, farm personnel will dispose of the carcasses in 
accordance with a biosecure protocol.
A state or federal regulatory official (or another indi-
vidual authorized by the incident commander) will col-
lect samples from each dead chicken by swabbing the 
oropharynx. Five oropharyngeal swab specimens will be 
pooled in a tube containing brain-heart infusion broth. 
The tubes containing oropharyngeal samples (5 swab 
specimens/tube) from each house on the premises will 
be submitted to an authorized state veterinary diagnostic 
laboratory. The brain-heart infusion broth in each tube 
submitted will be tested for avian influenza virus genetic 
material via the RRT-PCR assay procedure. Samples for 
RRT-PCR assays must be submitted to the laboratory on 
the same day the sample was collected. Laboratory per-
sonnel will perform RRT-PCR assays on these samples 
immediately upon receipt and electronically send test re-
sults to the incident commander by the end of each day. 
The incident commander will report test results to farm 
managers of the premises of origin as soon as possible.
Unmitigated risks and proximity—Movement re-
strictions in effect within a quarantined area will mitigate 
many of the risks associated with transmission of avian in-
fluenza virus. Movement of live and dead poultry, manure, 
eggs and egg products, poultry meat, egg packing materi-
als, and equipment from infected premises will be prohib-
ited. Entry of vendors, pullet trucks, liquid egg transports, 
shell egg trucks, and other nonessential vehicles will be 
prohibited. Movement of vaccination crews, loading crews, 
manure haulers, utility company employees, pest control 
personnel, and other nonessential people will be curtailed 
as well. However, risks associated with the following 8 fac-
tors (R
1
 through R
8
) cannot be completely mitigated by 
movement restrictions associated with a quarantine.
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Number of poultry oN iNfected premises (r
1
)
The number of infected animals is a major determi-
nant of the distance at which susceptible animals are at 
risk of infection from infected animals.21 The size of the 
viral reservoir is proportional to the number of poultry 
infected and the quantity of contaminated fecal materi-
al produced after the onset of infection.22 For regulatory 
purposes, all poultry on  premises with HPAI are treated 
as if they were infected. Avian influenza viruses may 
retain infectivity for at least 19 days in manure from 
specific pathogen–free chickens at 15° to 20°C (59° to 
68°F).23
productioN system of the iNfected premises  
aNd the fast eggs plaN premises (r
2
)
Poultry in different production systems are physi-
cally and functionally separated by management and 
biosecurity practices so that people and equipment do 
not move from one system to another. Each of the fol-
lowing 4 types of poultry enterprises represents a dif-
ferent production system: table-egg operations, broiler 
production, turkey enterprises, and backyard or hobby 
flocks. Commercial laying hens, broiler chickens, and 
turkeys are typically hatched in single-species hatch-
eries, raised indoors in flocks containing thousands of 
birds on farms dedicated to 1 type of poultry produc-
tion, and fed carefully formulated feed delivered to the 
farm in trucks from feed mills. Eggs and meat products 
enter market channels leading to distribution to mul-
tiple states. Each of the production systems is vertically 
coordinated.24 In contrast, backyard flocks comprise 
relatively small numbers of birds, multiple avian spe-
cies commonly exist outdoors on the same premises, 
feed is prepared on the premises or purchased in sacks 
from a feed store or grain elevator, and meat and eggs 
are consumed by the producer or sold locally. In the 
United States, backyard poultry flocks have not been 
associated with avian influenza outbreaks in commer-
cial poultry.12
High-pathogenicity avian influenza virus is not 
likely to spread to a commercial table-egg farm with a 
preexisting high level of biosecurity and a totally con-
fined population of laying hens if the infected prem-
ises belong to a different production system. However, 
services and personnel shared between egg production 
premises increase the risk of HPAI transmission. Com-
mercial table-egg operations with different owners may 
use the same grain elevator to provide feed, hire work-
ers from the same labor pool, use the same rendering 
service, or receive visits from the same vendors.25 Dif-
ferent commercial table-egg premises with the same 
owner may share additional resources such as trucks 
and equipment used to move pullets from grow sites 
to multiple egg farms owned by the company. Selected 
company employees (veterinarians and managers) may 
travel between different egg-production sites owned by 
the same company.12
deNsity of premises with susceptible birds  
arouNd the fast eggs plaN premises (r
3
)
Rapid transmission of HPAI virus among contig-
uous farms has occurred, and farms with susceptible 
birds located between the infected premises and the 
FAST Eggs Plan premises may serve as stepping stones 
for the spread of HPAI.26 The number of premises con-
taining susceptible avian populations within a 2-mile 
radius has been used to assess the risks to biosecurity of 
poultry farms.27 Epizootic poultry disease transmission 
has been associated with movement of humans, poul-
try, wildlife, and motor vehicles within a 2-mile radius 
of infected premises. Also, the national response plan 
makes use of a 2-mile radius to define the area of high 
risk around the infected premises.15
ambieNt outdoor temperature (r
4
)
The stability of avian influenza viruses declines with 
increasing temperature, so ambient temperatures can 
greatly influence survival time of this pathogen on me-
chanical vectors, such as motor-vehicle tires or equip-
ment, and in the environment. Persistence of avian influ-
enza virus in the environment is inversely proportional 
to environmental temperature.28 The greater the ambient 
temperature, the less time that avian influenza virus can 
remain infective. Avian influenza viruses are susceptible 
to inactivation by heating and drying but can survive for 
months in subfreezing conditions during cold winter 
months.13 The viruses can survive in fecal material for 
30 to 35 days at 4°C (39.2°F) and for 7 days at 20°C 
(68°F), for up to 72 hours at room temperature (approx 
21°C [70°F]) on the surface of tires and eggshells, and 
for 6 days on feathers.13,29,30 In an organic substrate, avian 
influenza viruses can remain viable for 15 days at room 
temperature.29 The mean of the high and low outdoor 
temperature on a given calendar day will be calculated 
and used to help determine the GRE.
preseNce of opeN water available  
to wild waterfowl (r
5
)
Proximity to open water is a measure of the risk 
posed by wild waterfowl. Ducks and geese are natural 
hosts for avian influenza virus and may transfer the vi-
rus from one location to another.13,14 Anyone or any-
thing sharing an environment with waterfowl may be 
a source of avian influenza virus for domestic poultry. 
Outbreaks of HPAI in domestic poultry have been as-
sociated with bodies of open water located < 0.62 miles 
(1 km) from the poultry facilities.31 In fresh water at 
16.7°C (62°F), H5N1 HPAI viruses can persist for 3 to 
5 months and some low-pathogenic avian influenza H5 
and H7 viruses may survive > 1 year.28 Wind transmis-
sion of avian influenza virus−contaminated water drop-
lets or fecal dust from the shore is a risk factor for in-
fection when ponds or lakes near poultry houses have 
been frequented by infected waterfowl.14
Number of wild terrestrial birds  
oN the iNfected premises (r6)
Entry of wild birds into poultry buildings is 1 
mechanism by which HPAI can be transmitted.13,14 
Wild birds may mechanically transfer contaminated fe-
ces from infected poultry to premises with susceptible 
domestic birds or become infected and disseminate the 
virus through their own feces and respiratory tract se-
cretions.8 Sparrows, feral pigeons, crows, and magpies 
have been infected with H5N1 HPAI virus.32 A subclini-
cal infection in tree sparrows was detected in China.32
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Number of outdoor flies oN the iNfected premises (r
7
)
Flies have the potential to serve as mechanical car-
riers of avian influenza virus by transporting contami-
nated fecal material from infected premises to premises 
with susceptible poultry. High-pathogenicity avian in-
fluenza H5N1 viruses have been detected in flies cap-
tured within a radius of 1.4 miles (2.25 km) around 
infected premises,33 and wind can carry flies over long 
distances.
distaNce betweeN the iNfected premises  
aNd the fast eggs plaN premises (r
8
)
Proximity to infected premises ≤ 0.93 miles 
(1.50 km) is reportedly a major risk factor for HPAI 
in individual flocks.34 The greater the distance from 
infected premises, the less the probability that viable 
avian influenza virus will be carried to chickens on 
an egg farm. Aerosol transmission of avian influen-
za virus can occur via small contaminated particles 
that remain suspended in air for prolonged periods. 
Aerosolized particles can be carried over several 
miles.13,14,35 High-pathogenicity avian influenza vi-
ruses have been detected in air samples collected up 
to 45 m away from chicken houses.30 Wind-blown 
feathers from poultry infected with HPAI virus are 
potentially infectious because of viral replication 
within the feathers and contamination of the feathers 
with fecal material from infected birds.36 Greater dis-
tances between infected premises and premises with 
susceptible birds allow more time for desiccation and 
UV light to inactivate avian influenza viruses associ-
ated with dust or feathers.
GRE—An equation was developed to estimate 
the risk of exposure to HPAI virus in a control area 
on the basis of total exposure risks not mitigated 
by a quarantine and the distance between the in-
fected premises and egg premises participating in 
the FAST Eggs Plan. By dividing total unmitigated 
risk by proximity, a numeric GRE can be obtained 
to provide a quantitative assessment of the exposure 
risk.22 To develop the equation, the importance of 
each risk factor was determined by a panel of 10 
poultry veterinarians. Panel members scored each 
risk factor on a scale from 1 (least important) to 4 
(most important).
In the equation developed for the GRE, numeric 
multiplication factors are used to represent the im-
portance assigned to each unmitigated risk factor 
by the panel (Table 1). The magnitude of each risk 
varies with circumstances associated with particu-
lar outbreaks and is expressed by a numeric value 
that may range from 0 (nonexistent risk) to 3 (severe 
risk). The proximity factor is expressed as the dis-
tance (miles) between infected premises and FAST 
Eggs Plan premises. Values for 6 of 8 unmitigated 
risk factors in the equation are objective values read-
ily available to a foreign animal disease investigator. 
Only 2 values (number of wild terrestrial birds and 
flies at the infected premises) require an estimate by 
the investigator.
Geospatial risk estimates within a control area may 
range from 1.8 for egg-production sites located 6.2 miles 
(9.98 km) from infected premises to 540 for premises 
located 0.1 mile (0.16 km) from infected premises. We 
propose that an estimate ≤ 25 represents a low risk of 
exposure, an estimate of 26 to 74 represents an inter-
mediate risk of exposure, and an estimate ≥ 75 repre-
sents a high risk of exposure. The value is calculated 
with the following formula:
GRE = (total unmitigated risk score/proximity  
to infected premises) =
(3R
1
 [chickens] + 3R
2
 [production system] + 3R3 [density] + 
3R
4
 [temperature] + 2R
5
 [water] + 2R
6
 [birds]  
+ 2R
7
 [flies])/R
8
 (distance)
Table	1—Summary	of	unmitigated	risks	of	exposure	to	avian	influenza	virus	in	a	control	area	used	in	an	equation	for	GRE	in	the	FAST	
Eggs	Plan.
	 Risk magnitude
Risk	 Risk importance	 0	 1	 2	 3
No. of poultry on IP (R1)*	 3	 —	  999	 1,000–9,999	  10,000
Production system (R2)	 3	 —	 Not a commercial  Egg farm, different owner	 Egg farm, same owner
      egg farm
Density of premises (R3)†	 3	 None	 1−3	 4−6	  7 
Mean temperature 3	 —	  22.8	 0.1−22.27	  0
    (°C; R4)‡	
Open water on or near	 2	 None	 On or near egg	 On or near IP,    On or near IP and 
   premises (R5)§     farm, not IP   not egg farm   egg farm
Wild birds on IP (R6)║	 2	 —	 Few	 Moderate	 Many
Outdoor flies on IP (R7)¶	 2	 None	 Few	 Moderate	 Many
Risk importance scores represent the degree of importance assigned by a panel of 10 poultry veterinarians with expertise in egg production 
and avian influenza: 1 = minor importance; 2 = potentially important; 3 = important; and 4 = very important. Risk magnitude scores range from 0 
(nonexistent risk) to 3 (severe risk) and vary with circumstances associated with particular outbreaks.
*Flock sizes based on the 2007 Small Enterprise Chicken Study of the National Animal Health Monitoring System.37 †Number of premises 
containing susceptible avian populations within a 2-mile (3.2-km) radius of the FAST Eggs Plan premises. ‡Mean temperature (high temperature 
+ low temperature/2) at the official weather reporting station nearest to the infected premises. §Near refers to open water within 0.62 miles of 
premises. ║Few is defined as  100 wild birds (wild birds in the area, but not many). Moderate is defined as 101 to 1,000 wild birds (many wild 
birds roosting and flying overhead). Many is defined as  1,000 wild birds (numerous flocks in the area, with many birds roosting on the premises). 
¶None is defined as no flies apparent (eg, during subfreezing temperatures). Few is defined as flies observed, but no fly concentrations apparent. 
Moderate is defined as localized fly concentrations apparent. Many is defined as widely disseminated fly concentrations and surfaces covered 
with flies observed.
IP = Infected premises. — = Not applicable.
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The following hypothetical scenario illustrates how 
this estimate can be used by an incident commander. An 
outbreak of HPAI is confirmed in a typical commercial 
in-line egg operation containing 3.2 million chickens 
in 16 houses. The outbreak occurs in late November 
when the mean outdoor temperature is 2.2°C (36°F). 
Only a few flies are present outside the buildings, and 
200 to 300 sparrows and grackles are observed eating 
spilled grain on the ground near feed bins on the in-
fected premises. In this scenario, the infected premises 
and noninfected FAST Eggs Plan premises owned by 
the same company are 1.2 miles (1.93 km) apart, and 
both premises have on-site egg-breaking operations that 
require open-water lagoons that are available to water-
fowl. In addition, a turkey farm, a ring-necked pheasant 
farm, and 3 backyard poultry flocks are located within a 
2-mile radius of the FAST Eggs Plan premises. The GRE 
in this scenario is calculated as follows:
GRE = (3[3] + 3[3] + 3[2] + 3[2] +  
2 [3] + 2[2] + 2[1])/1.2 = 35
The GRE score of 35 indicates that the FAST Egg 
Plan premises’ risk of exposure to HPAI virus is inter-
mediate. If the distance between the 2 premises had 
been ≥ 1.7 miles (2.74 km) or if the infected premises 
had been a small backyard flock, the GRE would have 
been 25, which suggests that the FAST Eggs Plan prem-
ises is at low risk for exposure to the HPAI virus.
Web-based Information
Data from the Biosecurity Checklist, GPS coordi-
nates of FAST Eggs Plan and surrounding premises, 
responses from the epidemiological questionnaire, 
PCR assay results, and GREs will be stored in each 
state’s database. These data can be accessed online, but 
only by authorized individuals. If a state is unable or 
does not wish to store the FAST Eggs Plan informa-
tion, the data may be stored in a database maintained 
by Iowa State University’s Center for Food Security 
and Public Health. Each registered egg producer will 
have a unique identifier and password with which to 
log in to the database and enter their appropriate farm 
information. The farm information will be highly en-
crypted and only viewable to the logged-in producer. 
In the event of an outbreak of HPAI, if an owner of 
registered FAST Eggs Plan premises wants to move 
eggs or egg products from a control area, it will be 
the responsibility of the egg producer to release their 
farm-specific information within the system to the 
surveillance-epidemiology personnel reporting to the 
incident commander.
The Web-based approach for this data collection 
system is practical because it only requires access to 
the World Wide Web and can be updated instanta-
neously. Internet communications with the server 
are kept to a minimum, and the program fully func-
tions even with a slow dial-up connection. Other 
than a Web browser, no special software programs are 
needed to access the database. If an update is made in 
the database, registrants will immediately have access 
to that update. This approach enhances information 
sharing and keeps costs to a minimum while instantly 
allowing appropriate individuals to access the latest 
updated information.
Conclusions
Federal and state animal health regulatory of-
ficials must have assurance that an egg-production 
site located within a control area is free of HPAI vi-
rus before movement of eggs and egg products can 
be allowed. Incident commanders can be confident 
that any given FAST Eggs Plan premises had a strin-
gent biosecurity program in place prior to the out-
break and that no epidemiological links to infected 
premises are known to exist. Geographic coordinates 
for FAST Eggs Plan premises can be compared with 
coordinates of infected premises and used to quick-
ly determine the distance between the 2 locations. 
During the chaotic early days of an outbreak, the 
GRE can be used by incident commanders to assess 
the likelihood that FAST Egg Plan premises will be 
exposed to HPAI virus from infected premises. Daily 
reports posted on the FAST Eggs Plan premises Web 
site will provide the surveillance-epidemiology task 
force in the incident command structure with RRT-
PCR assay results, mortality rates, feed consump-
tion, and egg production for each house on FAST 
Eggs Plan premises. Use of Web-based information 
will allow incident commanders to quickly deter-
mine whether shell eggs and liquid egg products 
from FAST Eggs Plan premises can be allowed to re-
sume movement into market channels with minimal 
risk to the safety of animal or human health. Infor-
mation from the Web page of FAST Eggs Plan prem-
ises and daily diagnostic test results can be used 
by state and federal animal health officials to make 
decisions regarding issuing permits for movement 
of eggs and egg products out of a control area dur-
ing an HPAI outbreak. Before eggs and egg products 
from FAST Eggs Plan premises are allowed to move 
into market channels during the initial days after 
a control area is established, excellent biosecurity 
must be in place; mortality rates, egg production, 
and feed and water consumption must be within 
usual limits; no epidemiological links to the infect-
ed premises must have been identified; and results 
of PCR assays from each house must be negative.
The FAST Eggs Plan will facilitate business con-
tinuity and economic survival of participating nonin-
fected egg operations in a control area after an out-
break of HPAI. Implementation of the plan will also 
help ensure the continuous availability of safe eggs 
and egg products for consumers. Robust biosecurity 
programs in place prior to an outbreak and daily docu-
mentation of the disease-free status of FAST Eggs Plan 
premises will reassure trading partners and consum-
ers of the safety of eggs and egg products. Raising the 
degree of biosecurity in participating egg operations 
will further enhance food security by preventing in-
troduction of other foreign and domestic diseases into 
table-egg flocks.
We believe that the FAST Eggs Plan will serve as an 
excellent model for other commodity groups seeking to 
promote business continuity while ensuring the safety 
of food products originating from livestock operations 
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in a control area. For example, a FAST Milk Plan, FAST 
Beef Plan, and FAST Pork Plan may be advantageous 
to dairy, beef, and pork producers and help protect the 
nation’s food supply.
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